We propose that the formation of beliefs be treated as statistical hypothesis tests, and we label such beliefs inferential expectations. If a belief is overturned through the build-up of evidence, agents are assumed to switch to the rational expectation. Rational expectations are shown to be a special (limiting) case of inferential expectations, with the test size α becoming a metric for rationality. When inferential expectations are built into a Dornbusch-style model of the exchange rate, regression tests of Uncovered Interest Parity and the rational expectations version of the term structure both display downward bias in the slope coefficient. We present the results of an experiment that supports inferential expectations.
Introduction
Rational Expectations (RE) applies the principle of rational behaviour to the acquisition and processing of information and to the formation of expectations (Maddock and Carter, 1982) . That is, economic modellers and policy-makers who use RE as a working hypothesis bestow upon their representative agents the ability to calculate mathematical expectations, and, when information is limited, to calculate unbiased and efficient parameter estimators. 3 This theory has had a central role in macroeconomics since the 1970s. It has been used to model phenomena as diverse as aggregate supply, exchange rates, consumption and economic cycles (Lucas, 1972; Dornbusch, 1976; Hall, 1978; Kydland and Prescott, 1982) . 4 Important empirical predictions about exchange rates (Frankel and Rose, 1995) and the term structure of interest rates (Mankiw and Miron, 1986) , employ RE as one of their key assumptions.
Despite its influence, the number of alleged empirical failures of RE has built up over the passage of time. In experimental settings, RE predictions are not rejected as null hypotheses in some contexts (see Dwyer et al., 1993) , but the most common outcome is that individuals do not hold RE (e.g., Schmalensee, 1976; Blomqvist, 1989; Camerer, 1995; Beckman and Downs, 1997; Swenson, 1997) . In addition, experimental research often finds either underutilization or over-utilization of priors (Camerer, 1995) .
One way to meet these criticisms is to build models where agents possess RE in financial markets, while allowing sluggish price adjustment elsewhere. As an approach, this is both simple and tractable, as the 'overshooting' exchange rate model of Dornbusch (1976) demonstrated. However, participants in financial markets have been forced to reveal frequent valuations of foreign exchange and securities for decades, and empirical tests for RE have not fared well.
Two tests in particular have proved troublesome. Under the joint hypotheses of RE, risk neutrality and zero transaction costs, the slope coefficients in a regression test of Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) and the RE version of the term structure should both be unity: 5 ) 2 ( ) ( 2 ) 1 ( *) ( Typically, the estimated coefficient in the UIP regression, (1), is less than unity, and sometimes it is even negative (Frankel and Rose, 1995) . Evidence based on (2) has not been as damning, but RE remains a seriously contested hypothesis. For example in a study of 3-, 6and 12-month euro-rates for 17 countries, Gerlach and Smets (1997) found the 76 per cent of regression coefficients were less than unity. One response by macroeconomists is to note that these regressions are testing joint hypotheses. For example, Gerlach and Smets argue that the addition of a time-varying risk premium can rescue RE. Granted the existence of such a premium, they argue along the lines of Mankiw and Miron (1986) that "it is easier to reject the expectations hypothesis in periods in which short-term rates are difficult to predict" (Gerlach and Smets, 1997, pg. 306) . 6 Attempts to explain the failure of UIP using a time-varying risk premium have run up against survey evidence which speaks strongly against RE (see Frankel and Froot, 1987) .
In this paper we propose a simple alternative to RE which is consistent with the above regression results, and for which we can offer some experimental evidence. While we cannot rule out the possibility of time-varying risk premia, our approach is to explain the failure of these regressions using the notion of belief conservatism.
Formally, we suggest that belief formation be treated as a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test, dubbed inferential expectations (IE). We assume that when a belief is overturned agents switch to RE. Thus, RE is thus a special case of IE if agents are unconcerned about mistakenly changing their beliefs (the test size α equals unity), or if there is so much information available about a parameter that it is known with certainty (the sampling distribution of the estimator collapses to a point at the limit) leading to the rejection of any incorrect null.
The intuition of IE is that economic agents hold beliefs that are subject to falsification by new information, in much the same way that they are in conventional statistical hypothesis testing.
In particular, a change in beliefs requires new information that exceeds a threshold, modelled here by statistical significance. Neyman-Pearson hypothesis tests can be postulated to operate as 'fast and frugal' heuristics (in the style of Gigerenzer et al., 1999) held by near-rational agents.
Thus we assert that beliefs about economic variables tend to be more subject to periods of inertia interspersed with occasional discrete shifts than what would be implied by RE. A key implication is that agents do not fully process new information every period -possibly because they underweight its value and possibly because they do not pay enough conscious attention to it -, even if they fully use information occasionally. IE therefore has much in common with other models of sluggish belief adjustment Reis, 2002, 2003) .
The alleged reluctance to change one's mind despite some contrary evidence is not a new idea in the philosophy of science (Kuhn, 1970) , and it has recently gained some acceptance in behavioural macroeconomic where "herding and procrastination help explain the significant departures of real-world economies from the competitive general-equilibrium model" (Akerlof, 2002, pg. 428, our italics) . Indeed, IE is built into the methodology of any social science that uses classical hypotheses tests as decisive evidence for changing beliefs. Whenever an academic economist uses a test to convince a colleague about the truth of a proposition, she implies that the belief in question will not be altered until probability values such as 0.05 or 0.01 are attained. 7 Thus, IE potentially explains temporary deviations from strict rationality while still imposing a plausible and simple structure on expectations which is consistent with economists' own practices in statistical data analysis. 8 We also present the results from a simple experimental environment where IE outperforms RE. Agents are asked to repeatedly declare the probability that a randomly chosen urn is of a particular kind, based on successive draws of balls from the chosen urn. An observed phenomenon that is explicable under IE (but not RE) is that agents sometimes do not change their declared probabilities in spite of receiving new information.
Our work is perhaps closest in spirit to Goldberg and Frydman (1996) and Frydman and Goldberg (2003) , who allow agents to conduct hypothesis tests over models. 9 Their research program, tracing its roots back at least to an informal discussion by Rappaport (1985) , allows for departures from rational beliefs, though it is more radical than the temporary departures envisaged in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we explain the theory underlying IE and describe a Dornbusch-style model with IE. In section 3 we prove that regressions (1) and (2) will have downward-biased coefficients. Section 4 provides the experimental evidence for IE. Section 5 concludes.
Inferential Expectations and Exchange Rate Determination
In all IE models, there is a cognitive target. This is a set of state variables or parameters that are believed to be in one of two states, described by the null hypothesis H 0 and the alternative hypothesis H 1 . 10 There is also a signal which is a model variable that provides information about the cognitive target. Finally there is a test statistic and a rejection region that are defined conventionally.
Formally, let x be a vector of parameters or random variables that are part of a data-generating process for a random variable p. Granted some economic significance to x, agents form beliefs about it, based on n stochastic signals p i (for i = 1, …, n).
The rational expectation is the mathematically best guess for x. The inferential expectation is the mathematically best guess for x, subject to conservatism about changing beliefs (made operational by a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test of size α), and incorporating any testing shortcuts that qualify as a 'fast and frugal' heuristic. When the concern about changing beliefs becomes vanishingly small (α → 1), IE and RE coincide. 11 The cognitive target is x, the signal p i , the test statistic some function of the p i 's, and the rejection region are the values of the test statistic that lead to a rejection of a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test of size α.
Under the assumption of IE, there is first 'under-use' of marginal pieces of information (by comparison with RE) and then 'over-use' (when beliefs change). As indicated in the introduction, RE is nested in IE when:
1. α equals unity. This is clear from the fact that α equals unity implies a rejection for any value of the test statistic. That being so, the RE belief is constantly embraced.
2.
x is a single parameter and n equals infinity (and memory is unbounded). If the p i 's are combined in an estimator for x whose sampling distribution variance is decreasing in n, the estimator collapses to a single point at the true value. All nulls will be overturned (except if the null is correct), and RE beliefs embraced.
To provide a macroeconomic context, consider a model in the spirit of Dornbusch (1976) :
In many applications, it will be a single variable or parameter. 11 This is true regardless of any shortcuts used in the testing procedure. If the test size is unity, then hypothesis testing is suspended (along with any shortcuts about distributional assumptions, etc.) because a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test minimizes the size of the probability of a type II error given the test size (probability of a type I error). That is, given a test size of unity, the best way to minimize the chance of falsely believing the null is to always reject it.
All variables are in logs, except the nominal short and long (two-period) interest rate, respectively i t and r t . All parameters are positive. Time zero is divided into pre-money-shock 0and post-money-shock 0 + ; afterwards, t = 1, 2, 3,……∞. The exchange rate, money, prices (domestic and foreign), output and foreign interest rates are s, m, p, p*, y and i*. The latter three variables, and m 0 -, are normalized to zero. Two steady states occur; one prior to a money shock (at 0 -) and the one after the shock has completely dissipated (at ∞). A monetary contraction ∆m (<0) occurs at time 0 + and is sustained forever. The pre-shock m of 0 implies a steady state of p 0 -= 0 and s 0 -= 0 (the latter from purchasing power parity). Equation (3) can be either an LM curve or a quasi-Taylor rule. For the latter, it is re-expressed with i as the subject and m as the nominal income target. 12 The standard Dornbusch assumption of sticky prices is adopted.
The standard Dornbusch solution assumes RE. That is, E(s t+1 )=s t+1 and E(i t+1 )=i t+1 . The eigenvalue of the system is (1-B p ), and the solution from t=0 + is given below (derivations in Appendix A).
The IE solution requires a plausible null belief. We assume that this is the belief that the central bank is engaging in a managed float, and that the initial steady-state exchange rate (s 0 -= 0) is its target level of the currency. 13 Until enough evidence builds up, agents believe that next period the central bank will defend the currency by driving the log-exchange rate back to zero, and keep it there forever. 14 Appendix A shows how this outcome could be achieved by driving i to zero next period, and keeping it there forever. To parameterize the IE hypothesis test, we assume that agents are making inference about the future values of s based on the latest time series observation on p. 15 Formally, the inference procedure has to decide between: H 0 : s t+j = 0, j > 0 (implying i t+j = 0 j > 0). H 1 : A standard Dornbusch money contraction will be sustained; m t+ j =∆m j > 0. 12 The model has a block recursive structure, which we will exploit to obtain analytic solutions under IE. A money shock drives p and i, via (long run) purchasing power parity, the quasi-Taylor rule, and the partial adjustment process for prices. Then, s and r are determined by (5) and (6). Purchasing power parity implies s+p*-p = 0. 13 This target can only be met by setting the appropriate level of interest rates, and departures from the target are possible. Therefore, the institutional setup of the model is a managed float (rather than a fixed rate regime) where the instrument is the interest rate (rather than foreign exchange intervention). 14 Or naive agents could view recent moves in i and s as 'turbulence', which will vanish next period. 15 Other signals are possible. Agents could stop believing the bank when non-zero interest rates persist.
Interpreting (3) as a quasi-Taylor rule, H 0 implies the central bank is permitting a temporary change in the price level, 16 while H 1 implies a permanent accommodation to a changed price level. In the latter case, the solution to the model is given by (7) to (9). Under H 1 , the steady state level of p and e would both be ∆m, from t=∞ in (7) and (9), consistently with purchasing power parity.
One possible interpretation of this analysis is that IE tells a story of the central bank having to give away a currency target, when the credibility strain becomes too great. 17 In this interpretation, the shock to m represents the implementation of policy that puts long-run purchasing power parity and the central bank exchange rate target at odds with one another. In the Dornbusch model, this would be recognized immediately, and the central bank would be ignored. RE agents work out the implied price level from the shock, and use purchasing power parity to calculate the implied long-run exchange rate. They then solve backwards using forecast interest differentials, forcing the current exchange rate to 'jump' once to its 'overshooting' value. In IE, the story is more subtle: IE agents initially believe that the central bank will defend the currency from next period. To solve for the exchange rate, they note that the long-run exchange rate will be zero and that all future interest differentials must be too (see Appendix A). Therefore, the current exchange rate does not have the long-run shock built in, nor does it account for future domestic returns. Initially it 'jumps', but only by the magnitude of the current (non-zero) interest differential (see (11)), since this is the only influence that IE agents recognize. Later on, when agents become disillusioned with the central bank, they factor in future returns and the shock to the long run, and the exchange rate jumps again, this time to attain the RE solution.
A rejection region and test statistic that is consistent with our parameterization of IE would be:
where α is the test size. 18 If α = 0, the null will never be overturned, as would be the case in any hypothesis test. If α = 1 the null will never be believed, and the model reverts to the RE solution, as required by IE. 19 At a 0.05 significance level agents believe that s and i will revert to their initial values (0) in subsequent periods, until prices have changed by 95 per cent of what is implied under H 1 . 16 H 0 implies steady-state s is zero, purchasing power parity therefore implies that steady-state p is likewise zero. 17 In our stylized shock, the central bank is fighting against an appreciation, while it pursues a deflationary policy. Naturally, it is possible to reverse the shock, so that the central bank is fighting against a depreciation while pursuing inflationary policy. However, to avoid negative nominal interest rates (a problem generally ignored in Dornbusch formulations) the i*=0 normalization would have to be dropped, creating less transparent algebra. 18 More generally, the weight in the weighted-average would be φ(α) and 1-φ(α), where φ(α) has the property that φ(1) = 1 and φ(0) = 0. 19 The second case where IE becomes RE (infinite sample size and unbounded memory) is not relevant if the test is based only on the most recent p (n is unity), as here. It would be possible to define a test statistic using a combination of the p's (n>1) such that the sampling distribution variance was decreasing in n. Time intervals could also be defined over progressively smaller increments, so that as n→∞ the null would be rejected immediately, ushering in the second case in the limit.
Thus, the cognitive target in this model is the set of all future exchange rates, the signal is p, the test statistic at time t is the most recent price level p t and the rejection region is given by (10).
It remains for us to specify the time path for s and r under H 0 , which alters the model by violating E(s t+1 )=s t+1 and E(i t+1 )=i t+1 . Under H 0 , s and i are forecast to revert to the original steady state next period, so that E(s t+1 )=E(i t+1 )=0. That being so, the actual evolution of i and p -which are not affected by expectations -are as before, while the solutions for s and r until H 0 is rejected come from (5) and (6) 
When H 0 is rejected, the exchange rate jumps to the Dornbusch path. This can be illustrated with the standard diagram. Importantly, IE has the capacity to deliver a sudden, and potentially large, change in a model variable -here the exchange rate -for a small increment of information, at the instant H 0 is rejected.
We now turn to two implications of IE in this model.
Downward Bias in OLS Regressions
We now show that data on s and r generated by this model with IE will, when placed in the OLS regressions (1) and (2), create downward bias in the parameters.
Theorem 1: If H 0 is believed for at least one period, the OLS coefficient from a regression of ∆s t+1 on i t will be less than unity.
Proof: Let t* be the time period in which H 0 is overturned. The numerator of the OLS coefficient can be decomposed into three terms; the cross product summed prior to, at, and after t*-1. 
Parenthetically, this establishes Theorem 1 for the special case of α = 0. Agents never switch from H 0 and an OLS regression of ∆s on i will fit perfectly, with a coefficient B p , which is assumed less than unity (see (4)).
The middle term of the numerator in (13) involves a change in the exchange rate as it jumps from the H 0 path at time t*-1 to the H 1 path at time t*. (See the bottom of right-hand panel in Figure 2 .) The H 1 value of the exchange rate is given by a combination of (8) and (9), and reflects a realization that the terminal value for the exchange rate has jumped down by ∆m.
Since B p is no larger than unity, 2-1/B p can never exceed unity. Since ∆m is negative, the bracketed term on the RHS must always be less than unity. The last term on the numerator of (13) is evaluated under H 1 so that (5) holds, with E(s t+1 )=s t+1 (since H 1 is embraced) and i*=0. Clearly:
Collecting the three parts, the OLS numerator is a weighted average of i 2 , with weights prior to the observations on the H 1 path strictly less than unity. 
Apart from the trivial case where H 0 is never believed (w t =1 always), the OLS coefficient must be strictly less than unity. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1: One of the weights in the OLS numerator can be negative.
Proof:
For small values of B p , noting that
the weight applied to i 2 t*-1 on the numerator of the OLS coefficient could be negative. This raises the possibility that the numerator, and therefore the whole estimate, could be negative. Q.E.D.
The intuition of Theorem 1 has already been outlined. Agents are not factoring in the altered steady-state purchasing power parity value of the exchange rate, which restrains the appreciation, compared with the RE solution under H 1 . Furthermore, from (14), the future change in the exchange rate is muted by a factor B p compared with the H 1 solution, reflecting a failure to factor in the future returns available from holding the domestic currency. In other words, the coefficient is biased down partly because the H 0 expectation of interest rates (zero for every future period) makes agents too pessimistic about returns, and partly because the jump appreciation (fall in s) between the H 0 and H 1 exchange rate paths occurs while the actual interest differential is positive. If the latter jump is large enough, it can make the coefficient negative, as implied by Lemma 1.
We conclude the section on UIP by noting that the regression (1) is often run with a constant term. Simulations confirm that the slope coefficient remains sensitive to the deep parameter B p , and that a negative obtains when B
βˆp is low. High values of α tend to magnify (15), making the coefficient negative, as the jump between paths occurs when i t*-1 is high. 20 We now turn to (2), the term structure regression.
Theorem 2: If H 0 is believed for at least one period, the OLS coefficient from a regression of ∆i t+1 on r t -i t will be biased downwards (strictly less than unity).
Proof: Under H 0 :
Under H 1 , equation (6) holds (with E(i t+1 )=i t+1 ) and so:
The OLS estimator is relatively simple to calculate, because the only variable involving a future change (∆i t+1 ) is unaffected by expectations, and so does not involve a complex jump between paths at the switch between H 0 and H 1 (as s did in (1)). Thus we can partition the sums into the terms where the respective hypotheses hold.
Clearly, a negative γˆ is impossible. As was the case for the UIP regression, (2) is often run with a constant term. As reviewed in Appendix B, simulations confirm that the slope coefficient remains sensitive to the deep parameter B p but the value of the slope coefficient is relatively robust to different values of α. We conclude this section by noting that our model connects interest-rate forecast errors and coefficient bias. Under the null, agents make errors in forecasting future interest differentials, since they incorrectly believe them to be zero. Thus, the downward bias in the expectation hypothesis and UIP coefficients is consistent with agents making interest-rate forecast errors Miron, 1986, and Gourinchas and Tornell, 2004) . 21
Inferential Expectations and Experimental Evidence

Introduction
In this section we briefly describe an individual choice experiment designed to test whether IE has significantly greater explanatory power than RE or, to put it differently, whether there are subjects for which assuming that α < 1 provides a better fit. 22 The individual choice design is best suited to test the idea of IE in its cleanest form, i.e. without having to worry about the strategic considerations that would arise from a strategic or market setting. As discussed in the introduction, the design is also meant to capture beliefs conservatism in a simple way: we predict that, contrary to RE, agents sometimes do not change beliefs in response to new information.
There were two urns reflecting two possible states of the worlds, namely different combinations of white and orange balls. The true state of the world was chosen randomly, and subjects received signals about its nature by the means of random ball draws with replacement from the 'chosen urn'. The prior probability of an urn being chosen was 0.5 at the start of the experiment, but should have then evolved differently according to the observed sequence of white and orange balls being drawn and, importantly, according to different models of expectation formation. We next describe the experimental design in more detail, and then move to the experimental predictions and results.
Experimental Design
The experiment was run in at the School of Finance and Economics, University of Technology Sydney, in September 2003. 23 Recruitment was through lecture announcements, posters, and UTS Online (a local forum for electronic notices). Recruits were predominantly, though not exclusively, undergraduate students. There were six experimental sessions, three for each of the two experimental conditions; all sessions had six subjects except the last one, which had seven, for a total of 37 subjects. The experiment lasted about two hours, and paid an average of 31.42 Australian dollars ($A). 24 The experiment was in two stages, structurally H 0 . Thus, a better interest-rate forecasting performance (a higher α) increases the coefficient (consistently with Mankiw and Miron, 1986) . Appendix A proves that the IE profile of interest rate expectations -namely E(i t+1 )=0 up until the null is overturned -can be consistent with the estimated persistence of interest rate predictions for reasonable parameters (as in Gourinchas and Tornell, 2004) . 22 For space constraints, we focus only on IE as alternative to RE in this paper. Menzies and Zizzo (2003) also consider two adaptive expectations algorithms, and we plan to consider one or two other algorithms in additional research. None of the algorithms we are aware of, however, can explain the key 'no switch' finding discussed in this section. 23 It was approved by the UTS Ethics Committee. The experimental instructions can be found in Appendix C. 24 This was roughly equal to 25 US dollars. unrelated to one another; in this paper we focus only on the first stage, which had six periods of fifteen rounds each and took over 75% of the session time.
At the start of the session subjects faced a table on the top of which there were two identical urns, a set of white and orange balls in a basket, and a screen. In the 0.7 condition, the experimenter (a) showed subjects that both urns were empty, (b) in front of the subjects, he took seven white balls and three orange balls and placed them in one of the two urns (Urn 1 in what follows) (c) and he took three white balls and seven orange balls and placed them in the other urn (Urn 2 in what follows); (d) he then hid both urns behind the screen. The 0.6 condition was identical to the 0.7 condition, except that Urn 1 got six white balls and four orange balls, and Urn 2 got four white balls and six orange balls.
At the start of each period subjects were reminded about the period number and then one of the two urns was randomly chosen by the flip of a coin in front of the subjects, and put on display. Let us label this urn the 'chosen urn'. It was made clear to the subjects that the probability of Urn 1 being chosen was 50% at the start of each period, but they were not told which urn had actually been chosen.
At the start of each round the experimenter drew a ball from the chosen urn, showed it to the subjects and then put it back in; subjects were asked to write down the ball color in correspondence to the correct period and round in their answer booklet, and then had to make a probability guess, between 0% and 100%, on how likely it was that the chosen urn was Urn 1. Subjects were told not to change choices made in previous rounds. 25
Once a period was completed, the following period got started with a new flip of the coin, up to the end of the 6 th period. It was made clear to the subjects that the probability an urn was chosen was entirely independent of the probability that it had been chosen in previous periods. 26 Payment was based on the guess made in a randomly chosen period and round picked at the end of the experiment. A standard quadratic scoring rule (e.g., Davis and Holt, 1993) was used in relation to this round to penalise incorrect answers: if the chosen urn was Urn 1, then subjects got 25 -25 × (guess -1) 2 $A; if the chosen urn was Urn 2, then subject got 25 -25 × guess 2 $A. Subjects were provided with a payment table detailing the payment for each level of error, without need of any computation on their part (see Appendix C). There was also a participation fee of 8 $A.
Experimental Predictions
Rational Expectations. The prior probability was set at 0.5. As information flowed in, RE (or, equivalently, IE with α = 1) predicted straightforward Bayesian updating depending on whether white or orange balls were drawn.
Inferential Expectations. The IE signal, say s i , is the drawn ball so that s i = 1 for a white ball and 0 for an orange ball. 27 The cognitive target is the probability that the chosen urn is Urn 1, or, relatedly, the total probability of drawing a white ball, given the beliefs about the chosen urn, denoted p w . 28 It is simpler to describe the test with the second cognitive target (the total probability of a white ball), since the test statistic becomes the sample proportion of ones, .
With both urns equally likely at the start, the original null is that the total probability of a white ball is 0.5. i ŝ 29 The appropriate test here is a two-sided test, and we assume that agents use one of two alternative shortcuts to determine the rejection region. The first method, the Normal approximation method, 30 requires agents to maintain the belief corresponding to the null hypothesis until signal i is received such that:
The second method is nonparametric and relies on Chebyshev's inequality 31 :
where z is a standardized random variable (the distance from the mean in units of standard deviations), and the weak inequality is relevant for a discrete random variable. If the probability of getting an observation more than k standard deviations away from the mean is less than 1/k 2 , we may set 1/k 2 equal to α, and make a rare event statement. 32
The main advantage of employing Chebyshev's inequality is that it only requires the computation of mean and variance, sidestepping the need for distributional assumptions, albeit at a loss of statistical power. If Chebyshev's inequality is used, we reject H 0 if:
Both shortcuts can be considered as consistent with a view of IE as a fast and frugal heuristic. In what follows we label IE N the predictions of IE complemented with Normal approximation and IE C the predictions of IE complemented with Chebyshev's inequality. In both cases we estimate the value of α corresponding to each experimental subject by using a least squares method, i.e. by minimizing the sum of squared errors between predictions and observations. That is, we consider all the choices made across rounds and periods by each subject (90 in the full sample) and we find the subject-specific value of α that minimizes the sum of squared differences between IE (IE C or IE N ) and such choices. 33 Experimental Hypothesis. We can compute the expectations profile for RE, IE N , and IE C agents in relation to each session, using the sequence of observed ball draws and the procedures described so far. HYPOTHESIS 1. IE N and IE C have lower mean square errors from empirically observed choices than RE. HYPOTHESIS 2. IE N and IE C are better able to predict belief conservatism than RE. Appendix E presents two additional hypotheses designed to test the robustness of IE. In testing Hypothesis 1 and 2 we used not only the 'full' sample from all six periods but also an 'experienced' sample which removes the observations from periods 1 and 2, thus allowing subjects to get some practice and experience about the nature of the task. We also considered a 'restricted' sample of observations where periods in which subjects altered their choices (notwithstanding our instructions to the contrary), and periods where some misperceptions occurred in the recording of the colour of the balls, were removed. 34 Overall, we employed four samples: the full sample, the experienced sample, the restricted sample, and the experienced restricted sample.
Experimental Results
Estimation of α values. Figure 3 provides histograms for the distribution of α for both IE N and IE C , in the various samples. In the experienced (full) sample mean α values were 0.585 (0.635) for IE N and 0.767 (0.813) for IE C ; mean values in the corresponding restricted samples were virtually identical (see Table 3 ). Table 4 shows the percentage of subjects displaying α < 1 and α < 0.9 in the various samples. A non-negligible fraction of agents had α < 1 in both cases: for example, in the experienced sample, 14 out of 37 subjects (0.378) seems to have employed α < 1 for IE C , a number rising to 29 out of 37 (0.757) for IE N . It is interesting to look also at the α < 0.9 fraction of agents, as this may remove α estimation cases which are virtually indistinguishable, in terms of goodness of fit and predictions, from α = 1. For IE C , all but one of the 11-14 subjects for whom α < 1 also have α < 0.9. For IE N , over half of the subjects have α < 0.9.
The clear differences in the distributions of αs between IE N and IE C may suggest that IE N and IE C may bear little relation to one another. However, while there were differences in the distributions of the αs, Pearson r (IE N , IE C ) is equal to 0.887, 0.843, 0.890 and 0.845 in the full, experienced, restricted, and experienced restricted samples respectively 35 (P < 0.001).
Although IE N values tend to be lower than IE C values, IE N and IE C predictions tend to follow each other closely.
Appendix E provides additional results about α estimation. We show that α values are robust between conditions and, if estimated on a period-by-period basis, they do not tend to converge to 1, i.e. to the RE benchmark. Another way of looking at the data is to constrain α to take only one possible value below 1, so as to classify subjects in one of just two categories, RE holders and IE (with α < 1) holders. Table 5 illustrates the results of this exercise. Notes: The table displays the estimated value of α if α is allowed to take only one value less than 1, and the percentage of subjects for which α < 1 correspondingly applies. In two cases α is expressed as a range since any value of α within this range has an equally good fit.
Even under the constraint of only one value α < 1, between 16 and 22% are estimated to have IE, and α values are around 0.05 for IE N and for two out of four samples for IE C . 36
Hypothesis 1. We test Hypothesis 1 by computing the mean square error (MSE) values between choices and predictions according to each algorithm. One problem in doing so is the very likely non-independence of observations made by each subject. To address this problem, we use MSE values computed by observation, but only as the basis for a nonparametric sign test, with the number of subjects n = 37 as the degrees of freedom. 37 The results of the sign tests 38 are illustrated in Table 6 .
( Table 6 appears at the end of the document.) IE N outperforms IE C : for example, in the experienced sample, out of 37 subjects IE N performed worse than IE C twice, tied for twenty-two subjects, and performed better 14 times 35 Spearman ρ (IE N , IE C ) is equal to 0.822, 0.774, 0.831 and 0.775 in the full, experienced, restricted, and experienced restricted samples respectively (P < 0.001). 36 In the rest of this section we use the MSE-minimizing α values, rather than these constrained values. 37 We perform robustness checks by running sign tests also on MSE values computed by period and on MSE values computed by subject. See Appendix D for details. 38 We cannot use Wilcoxon tests because Wilcoxon tests rely on the assumption that the sample is drawn from a symmetric distribution, assumption which is clearly violated in this case. For results of (also unsatisfactory) F tests, see Menzies and Zizzo (2004) .
(P = 0.007, two-tailed). An electronically available appendix 39 contains the mean choices and predictions according to each model of expectation formation by session and period; Figure 4 exemplifies the kind of aggregate dynamics observed by reproducing the graphs from session 4 (a 0.7 condition session). Notes: the lines for IE C and IE N overlap in period 1.
In period 1 RE performs better in the first seven rounds, but IE does better on average afterwards. In periods 2 and 6, IE may be doing a better job in capturing the lower variability of choice relative to RE. In periods 3, 4 and 5 IE clearly does a better job at tracking mean choices than RE. Relative to RE, there appears to be a lower mean sensitivity of IE (with α < 1) predictions to new information (though exceptions exist).
Hypothesis 2. RE predicts that agents should revise their guesses every round in response to new information. This is not the case: Table 7 reports that 35% of the times subjects chose not to switch guesses. Observed, IE C and IE N are the fractions of not switching choices (i.e., not different from previous round in same period) respectively observed or predicted by IE C and IE N . ρ( IE C ) and ρ( IE N ) are the respective Spearman correlation coefficients of the percentage of no switches predicted for each subject by IE C and IE N with the observed percentage of no switches.°: significant at the 0.1 level; *: significant at the 0.05 level; **: significant at the 0.01 level. This is very close to the mean predictions of IE N and IE C (with MSE-minimizing α values), which depending on the sample chosen range between 30% and 42% (the difference is never significant in nonparametric Wilcoxon tests 40 ). Spearman correlation coefficients between the mean amount of 'no switches' observed and predicted by IE N and IE C show, however, that, while IE N has predictive power, IE C has not.
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper has presented a new model of belief formation. The basic idea of IE is that beliefs are maintained or revised using a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test. They are rejected in favour of RE only when the rejection region, determined by the test size α, is reached. The nesting of RE within IE means that the estimated α becomes a metric for the 'rationality'the closeness to RE beliefs -of agents.
This fast and frugal heuristic is consistent with the scientific practices of most scientists, and with a view of decision-making characterized by information-gathering and information-processing costs. It is also consistent with the view that agents do not pay attention all the time to new flows of information, and only when a threshold is reached do they pay attention and switch beliefs. Our experimental setup was a fairly hostile one for inferential expectations since the only task subjects had to do was to choose probabilities, and hence attention is unlikely to have been a serious issue: this may under-estimate the use of inferential expectations. Yet, our experimental evidence suggested that between one and two thirds of agents exhibited α's less than 0.9, and that there is significant evidence of belief conservatism. When we constrained α to take only one possible value other than 1, we found that for IE complemented by the normal approximation method this value was in the region of a 0.05 significance level for around one-fifth of the subjects.
We presented a variant of the Dornbusch (1976) model, and showed that simply replacing RE with IE can explain the empirical failures of regressions on uncovered interest parity and on the term structure of interest rates. Naturally, these results may be contingent upon the specification of the null and alternative hypotheses, the assumption of a common α across all agents and the macro-model within which the exchange rate and long interest rate are imbedded. Nevertheless, we suggest that our approach may be valuable, since it attributes the extent of parameter bias to deep model parameters, rather than risk premia.
We intend to develop IE further, both theoretically and empirically. In future work we hope to place IE into full scale macroeconomic models, to see if equations (1) and (2) continue to display parameter bias. Inferential expectations could also be relevant for more sophisticated hypothesis testing, for example to detect the presence of autocorrelation, as in Rotheli (1998) . Finally, we have confined our attention to a single change in belief. If continual inference on the long-run exchange rate meant repeated changes in beliefs, the variance of the current exchange rate would be dominated by 'shocks' (really belief changes) to the long-run rate (Campbell and Clarida, 1987) . The goal of this paper has simply been to define IE, present some evidence in favour of it, and demonstrate its potential fruitfulness as a modelling device.
APPENDIX A. EXCHANGE RATE MODEL
A.1 DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS (7)- (9) With the normalizations in the text, the RE system becomes:
The steady-state level of prices in (4') is ∆m from the properties of the system in the steady state. As ∆s=0=i (from (5')), p=m=∆m (from (3') ). Furthermore, from purchasing power parity (which holds in the steady state) s=p=∆m. We now solve the system.
is zero from the Dornbusch assumption of sticky prices (p 0+ =p 0 -). The eigenvalue of the system is clearly (1-B p ) . To find i, we substitute m=∆m and (7) into money demand.
Clearly, i t+1 =(1-B p )i t . To obtain s, (5') is iterated forward to infinity (when s=∆m) and the infinite GP, with ratio (1-B p ) , is summed.
A.2 COHERENCE OF BELIEFS ON THE CENTRAL BANK POLICY
This part of the appendix demonstrates that the central bank policy of driving all future log-exchange rates to zero (i.e. s = 0) is achievable, even though the price level has already changed (for t > 0).
First, by solving (5') forwards and assuming s ∞ =0, it is clear that setting all future i to zero will force all future s to zero (solving back from the long run). Setting i=0 in the money demand equation (3') requires m=p. How is p determined? Again assuming s ∞ =0 purchasing power parity implies p ∞ =0. Thus, if steady-state p is zero, equation (4') becomes p t+1 =(1-B p )p t or p z =p t (1-B p ) z-t , where z (> t) refers to all future periods from t.
Thus, IE agents who understand the model and who think that the central bank's desired log-exchange rate is zero (including, crucially, s ∞ =0) will believe, coherently with these beliefs, that at period t+1 the money stock (or the nominal income target if (3') is a Taylor rule) will jump back to p t+1 =p t (1-B p ) so that interest rates will be zero (since m-p will be zero); and that, from t+1 forward, m will equal p and both will converge to zero at rate (1-B p ) .
Such a policy implies that the central bank is permitting only a temporary change to the price level (p ∞ =0 as noted in the text), and that all future interest differentials are zero (as noted in the statement of H 0 ).
A.3 INTEREST RATE FORECASTING
It was asserted in the text that, under IE, a regression of the expectation of i t+1 (at time t) on current i t (without a constant term) can yield a high autocorrelation parameter for low values of B p and high values of α. We present here the proof of this statement (related computer simulations can be found in Appendix B).
Proof:
The OLS coefficient numerator is divided into two parts, with one part vanishing. That being so, a low B p implies a high (close to unity) autocorrelation. If we are prepared to assume a large sample, and define t* according to the rejection region (10) for p t :
we can further simplify the OLS parameter using (8). 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0 .5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9]. We then ran six sets of regressions for each of this version. Two sets are the uncovered interest rate regressions (equation (1) in the main text), with and without the constant term. The third and fourth sets correspond to the term structure regressions (equation (2) in the main text), with and without the constant term. The last two sets are interest rate forecasting regressions (under IE), again with and without the constant term: Table 1 considered the UIP regressions with constant, with mean slope coefficient values classified by α and β p . Table 8 is also on the UIP regressions. We find that the UIP slope coefficient is robustly lower than 1 both in regressions with and without slope. It is lower for lower β i and α values and the higher the β i . Overall, the downwards bias shows a considerable degree of robustness, especially for realistic values of β p (0.1-0.3), equivalent to 75% of the impact on inflation occurring between 1 and 3 years. Term structure regressions. In the main text, Table 2 considered the term structure regressions with constant, with mean slope coefficient values classified by α and β p . Table 9 is also on the term structure regressions. As predicted by equation (16), the slope coefficient is lower with lower β p values, leading to small mean coefficients for β p ≤ 0.3. Slope coefficients are very robust to the presence of a constant and to different α values, and entirely invariant to changes in β i . Interest forecasting regressions. Tables 10 through 12 consider interest rate forecasting equations. They show that, for β p ≤ 0.3 and high values of α, the mean slope coefficient can be positive and larger than 0. 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 0.9 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 (0) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) You are playing Stage 1 first. You can see two identical urns on the table, and a set of white and orange balls in a basket; you can also see a screen. The experimenter will shortly do the following: (a) show you that the urns are empty; (b) take seven white balls and three orange balls, and put them in one of the two urns; let us label this urn Urn 1; (c) take three white balls and seven orange balls, and put them in the other urn; let us label this urn Urn 2; (d) hide both urns behind the screen.
There are six periods in Stage 1. You have received an answer booklet with a sheet for each period.
At the start of each period, the experimenter announces the period number and writes it on the board. Then one of the two urns will be randomly chosen, by the flip of a coin, independently of what urns were chosen in previous periods. You will not be able to see whether this chosen urn is Urn 1 or Urn 2, but you will be asked to guess how likely you think it is that the chosen urn is Urn 1.
There are sixteen draws in each period. At the start of each draw the experimenter announces the draw number and writes it on the board. In Draw 0, which happens at the start of the period, your best probability guess that the chosen urn is Urn 1 would have to be 50%: this is because at the start of each period the chosen urn is picked randomly afresh. This Draw 0 probability guess has been printed into the answer booklet for you.
For Draws 1 through Draw 15 inclusive:
1. first, the experimenter draws a ball from the chosen urn and announces whether it is white or orange; please write the ball colour on the answer sheet, in the line corresponding to the correct period and draw; the experimenter then puts the ball back into the chosen urn;
2. second, you have to answer the following question: "how likely is it that the chosen urn is Urn 1? (Remember, Urn 1 is the urn with 7 white and 3 orange balls). Please choose a probability over the range 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely certain)"; please put your guess in the line in the answer booklet corresponding to the correct period and draw.
At the end of the period the experimenter hides the chosen urn again behind the screen. If you are in periods 1 through 5, you should move on to the answer sheet for the following period. If you are in period 6, please wait until the sheets are collected and the material for Stage 2 is distributed.
Stage 1 Payment. It is important that you try to make your best probability guesses, both because it is important for the value of the experiment, and because your final winnings depend on it. At the end of the experiment the experimenter will randomly choose a winning draw to reward your performance. The experimenter will roll a die to choose the period, and pick randomly from a third urn (with balls numbered between 1 through 15) to choose the winning draw. Your Stage 1 Payment will depend on your choice in the draw corresponding to the number on the ball which has been picked. In relation to this draw, the experimenter will take your choice and compare it with the true chosen urn for that draw. If in the winning draw the chosen urn was Urn 1, then the correct probability of the chosen urn being Urn 1 is 100%; if the chosen urn was Urn 2, then the correct probability of the chosen urn being Urn 1 is 0%. Your Stage 1 Payment will then be equal to 25 -25 × (guess -correct probability) 2 that is, to 25 dollars minus a penalty. The penalty will be equal to the square of the error, that is of difference between the guess and the correct probability, multiplied by 25. The Stage 1 Payment will be higher the more correct your guess is. The enclosed How likely is it that the chosen urn is Urn 1? (Remember, Urn 1 is the urn with 7 white and 3 orange balls). Please choose a probability over the range 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely certain). Write down your answer in the Probability Guess column.
Do not change probability guesses corresponding to previous draws. If you do, you are liable to to be expelled from the experiment, and forfeit all winnings (including the participation fee).
If you discover that you have put your guesses in the wrong place (say, the wrong page or wrong row), please raise your hand.
Draw Drawn Ball Colour
Your Probability Guess 0 50% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Instructions for 0.6 Condition These were identical to those for the 0.7 condition, except that 'six balls' ('6 balls') were replaced for 'seven balls' ('7 balls'), and 'four balls' ('4 balls') for 'three place' ('3 balls').
APPENDIX D. COMPUTATION OF MEAN SUM OF SQUARES ERROR AND ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
The mean sum of squares error (MSE) is equal to the sum of squares error (SSE) divided by the number of relevant datapoints.
D.1 Sign Tests
For the purpose of nonparametric sign tests, an algorithm x fits better than an algorithm y to predict the choices by a given experimental participant if she has a lower MSE if we were to predict her choices using algorithm x than if we were to predict her choices using algorithm y. Therefore we are interested in computing MSE values at the level of each experimental participant, i.e. at the level of the goodness of fit of each algorithm for each experimental participant.
Define R the number of rounds that are included in the sample for each participant; r = 15 the number of rounds in a given period (always 15); q the number of periods that are included in the sample for each participant. Clearly, R = rq by definition. There are three procedures to compute the MSE at the level of each experimental participant. where R = rq: R = 90 for the full sample and for most subjects in the restricted sample (i.e., whenever q = 6); R = 75 for the nine subjects with contaminated periods (one each) in the restricted sample (i.e., whenever q = 5); R = 60 for the experienced sample and for most subjects in the experienced restricted sample (i.e., whenever q = 4); R = 45 for the four subjects with contaminated periods (one each) among periods 3-6 in the experienced restricted sample (i.e., whenever q = 3). MSE by observation values provide the natural measure in relation to which to estimate sign tests, as in section 5.4.
MSE by period.
It is possible to compute the mean squared difference by period between predictions and observations. The relevant test statistic here is where r = 15 and the value of q depends on the number of periods in the sample: q = 6 in the full sample and in most cases in the restricted sample; q = 5 for the nine subjects with contaminated periods (one each) in the restricted sample; q = 4 in the experienced and in most cases in the experienced restricted sample; q = 3 for the four subjects with contaminated periods (one each) among periods 3-6 in the experienced restricted sample.
MSE by subject.
It is possible to compute for each subject the square of the sum of differences between predictions and observations. For the purpose of sign tests where the analysis is at the level of goodness of fit at the level of each experimental participant, the MSE by subject is, by construction, the same as the SSE by subject. The relevant test statistic is 
D.2 Robustness Tests
In this appendix we run sign tests using MSE values computed by period or by subject rather than by observation as in the main text. The results are shown in Table 13 . (Table 13 appears at the end of the document.) IE N and IE C always outperform RE. IE N outperforms IE C in the MSE analysis by period, and in two of the four samples in the MSE analysis by subject.
APPENDIX E. TESTS OF ROBUSTNESS OF α ESTIMATES
E.1 Experimental Hypotheses
This appendix discusses two additional hypotheses, designed to test the robustness of IE. The first hypothesis is a test of the robustness of α estimates to changes in the task they are estimated from. HYPOTHESIS 3. Mean α values do not significantly differ between the 0.6 and 0.7 conditions.
We also aim to test whether there is some sense in which agents do not converge towards RE as the experiment progresses. To test this, we employ the least squares method to estimate α values that best fit each period as played by each subject. That is, we consider the 15 choices made by a given subject in a given period, and we find the period-specific value of α that mimimizes the sum of squared errors between predictions and observations. Thus, for each subject there are six period-specific values of α, and one can analyze whether these periodspecific values followed any particular dynamic pattern in the experiment. HYPOTHESIS 4. Mean period-specific α values tend to converge to 1 as the experiment progresses and the subjects have opportunities to learn about the nature of the task.
With Hypothesis 4, we aim to verify the absence of any obvious convergence towards greater RE play (i.e., IE with α = 1) across the 90 rounds of the experiment.
E.2 Experimental Results
Hypothesis 3. As shown by Table 3 in the main text, mean α values are surprisingly stable between the two conditions. While the size of the difference changes depending on the sample and IE measure used, Hypothesis 3 can never be rejected (at P < 0.1 or better) in Mann-Whitney tests. The greatest variability occurs for the full sample and for the restricted sample in relation to IE N . In all other cases mean α values are within at most 0.06 of one another.
Hypothesis 4. The fact that the evidence for the other hypotheses is robust to the removal of the first two periods, as in the experienced sample, already suggests that IE may not tend to converge to RE as experience grows. Figure 5 shows the absence of any convergence to RE across the ninety rounds of the experiment. Spearman correlation coefficients between mean α values and period number are not statistically significant (and are within 0.025 of 0) for all samples and both for IE C and IE N . 
